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A LOOK AT SOCIAL HOST AND DRAM SHOP
LIABILITY FROM PRE-GAME TAILGATING TO
POST-GAME BARHOPPING
I. INTRODUCTION
Alcohol has become inextricably tied to sports. Alcohol can be
seen in sponsorship deals-as the official beer of an entire league,
such as Coors and the National Football League; as the official beer of
a part of a field, such as the Bud Light Bleachers at Wrigley Field; and
in advertisements in and around the stadium, court, rink, or field, such
as the Budweiser rooftop on Waveland Avenue and the Miller Lite
billboard on Sheffield Avenue in Chicago. The consumption of alco-
hol has become as much a part of the game as the action taking place
between the two teams. This notion is especially true when there is an
altercation in the stands, where many fans' attention moves away from
the game and onto the few individuals who have become drunk and
disorderly. We are also reminded of the connection between alcohol
and sports when someone is injured by an intoxicated individual who
has attended a sporting contest. The question to be asked is who
should be held responsible when this type of incident occurs.
This discussion will review social host and dram shop liability as it
applies to tailgaters, concessionaires, teams, and leagues. Part II pro-
vides definitions of critical terms used throughout the discussion. Part
III reviews the common law approach to the imposition of liability
upon commercial distributors of alcohol. Part IV explains the devel-
opment of social host and dram shop liability and state legislatures'
reactions to the imposition of either. Part V reviews the liability of
tailgaters, concessionaires, teams, and leagues in two cases, one from
Pennsylvania and one from New Jersey. Part VI provides a discussion
of what characteristics define someone who is visibly intoxicated. Part
VII illustrates what the outcome of Verni v. Stevens' would have been
under a set of presumed circumstances. Finally, Part VIII illustrates
what the outcome of Verni would have been under the same set of
presumed circumstances in a number of other jurisdictions.
1. Verni v. Stevens, 903 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
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II. DEFINITIONS
Black's Law Dictionary defines dram shop liability as "[c]ivil liabil-
ity of a commercial seller of alcoholic beverages for personal injury
caused by an intoxicated customer. Claims based on a similar type of
liability have been brought against private citizens for personal injury
caused by an intoxicated social guest." 2 There is no duty to control
the conduct of a third person so as to prevent him from causing physi-
cal harm to another unless (a) a special relation exists between the
actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to
control the third person's conduct, or (b) a special relation exists be-
tween the actor and the other which gives to the other a right to
protection.3
A social host "is a person or entity that provides free alcoholic bev-
erages" 4 to social guests. In other words, a social host is an individual
who gratuitously furnishes alcohol to a guest who has been invited to
enter or remain on another person's property for private entertain-
ment. A social guest is sometimes referred to as a licensee or "one
who has permission to enter or use another's premises, but only for
one's own purposes and not for the occupier's benefit." 5 In order to
avoid confusion, for purposes of this discussion a "licensee" or "li-
censed alcoholic beverage server" shall mean a person who is licensed
to sell alcoholic beverages or who has been issued a permit to sell
alcoholic beverages and not to refer to a social guest.
A stadium, team, or league is not a social host because fans are
considered invitees. An invitee is "a person who has an express or
implied invitation to enter or use another's premises, such as a busi-
ness visitor or a member of the public to whom the premises are held
open."6 Stadiums, in the context of dram shop liability, are analogous
to bars in that the public is invited to come watch a game and, if they
so choose, to pay for and consume alcohol. Also, stadium owners,
whether a team or private individual, are not considered the social
hosts of tailgaters because the stadium does not provide free alcoholic
beverages for the tailgaters.
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 419 (8th ed. 2005).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §315 (2000).
4. Hinebaugh v. Pa. Snowseekers Snowmobile Club, 63 Pa. D. & C. 4th 140, 151 (2003).
5. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 765 (8th ed. 2005).
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 687 (8th ed. 2005).
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III. COMMON LAW
There are two types of actionable negligence: common law and
statutory.
Common-law actionable negligence is the failure of one owing a
duty to another to do what a reasonable and prudent person would
ordinarily have done under the circumstances, or doing what such a
person would not have done, which omission or commission is the
proximate cause of injury to the other.7
At common law, "the personal representative of a deceased per-
son" could not maintain an action "for loss or damage resulting from
his death" against a furnisher of alcohol, due to the then well settled
rule that "a right of action based on a tort or injury to the person, died
with the person injured."8
In King v. Henkie,9 Susan King, the widow and administratrix of
James King, brought an action against Benjamin Henkie, the owner of
a bar, and two of his employees.10 Although the owner and employ-
ees saw that James King was "in a helpless state of intoxication" and
knew he was "a man of known intemperate habits" they furnished to
him "a large quantity of intoxicating liquors which he drank, and
which caused [his death] before he left [the bar]."" According to Ala-
bama law, it was a misdemeanor for a retailer to sell liquor to an in-
toxicated person of known intemperate habits. 12 The Supreme Court
of Alabama held that the death was not proximately caused by the
wrongful act of the sale of intoxicating liquor but, instead, by James
King's own act of drinking it after it was sold to him.' 3 The court first
looked to the statute under which the action was brought which
stated:
[Wihen the death of a person is caused by the wrongful act or omis-
sion of another, the personal representative of the former may
maintain an action against the latter at any time within two years
thereafter, if the former could have maintained an action against the
latter for the same act or omission, had it failed to produce death,
and may recover such sum as the jury deem just.14
7. Pratt v. Daly, 104 P.2d 147, 148 (Ariz. 1940) (citing Salt River Valley W.U. Ass'n v.
Compton, 8 P.2d 249 (Ariz. 1932)).
8. King v. Henkie, 80 Ala. 505 (1886).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. King, 80 Ala. at 505; Code, 1876, §2641
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The purpose of the statute was to correct the well-settled common
law rule previously noted by allowing a right of action "only in cases
where the deceased himself, if the injury had not resulted in his death,
might have sustained a recovery."15 The court reasoned that it must
necessarily follow that "where the negligence of the person killed has
contributed proximately to the fatal injury, no action can be main-
tained by his personal representative . . . because the deceased himself
would not have been entitled to recover had the injury not proved
fatal."16 The court found that the sale of alcohol was merely a secon-
dary or intervening cause, and the drinking of the liquor, which was an
act of James King, was the proximate cause of the fatal result.' 7
Stated another way, voluntary consumption of alcohol acted as a su-
perseding cause thereby relieving the server of any liability.
The common law rule was fully settled that "if an injury has resulted
in consequence of a certain wrongful act or omission, but only through
or by means of some intervening cause, from which last cause the in-
jury followed as a direct and immediate consequence, the law will re-
fer the damage to the last or proximate cause, and refuse to trace it to
that which was more remote."" Because the consumption of alcohol,
rather than the furnishing of alcohol, was viewed as the proximate
cause, at common law, a third party injured by an intoxicated person
would also be unable to maintain an action against a furnisher of
alcohol.
Several exceptions to the common law rule included imposing liabil-
ity upon licensed distributors who sold intoxicating liquors to custom-
ers who lack control over their consumption, whose spouses warned
distributors not to give them alcohol, or who were induced to drink
when their 'mental facilities [were] suspended by intoxication."9
In sum, the line of reasoning followed in common law negligence
actions was (a) that selling intoxicating liquor was a lawful act and,
therefore, could not in itself be negligence, and (b) if the sale were
unlawful, it was merely a secondary cause that could not cause harm
unless the liquor was consumed by the purchaser. 20
15. King, 80 Ala. at 505
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151, 155 n.3 (Cal. 1971).
20. Pratt v. Daly, 104 P.2d 147, 148 (Ariz. 1940).
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IV. LEGISLATIVE REACTIONS TO SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY AND
DRAM SHOP LIABILITY
The common law rule has been substantially abrogated in many
states by statutes specifically imposing civil liability upon a furnisher
of intoxicating liquor under specified circumstances.
Most courts imposing liability on social hosts have not relied on the
dram shop statutes, but rather have applied principles of common law
negligence. In the very few states in which courts have found a duty
on the part of a social host to a person hurt by the drinker, the legisla-
tures have quickly reinstated either complete immunity or granted the
social host very strong protection.
Two states that used their dram shop acts as the basis for imposing
social host liability were Iowa and Minnesota. Both states later abro-
gated their decisions that imposed liability against social hosts.
A. Iowa
In Williams v. Klemesrud,21 Richard Klemesrud purchased a pint of
vodka for his underage friend, Robert Neis.22 Klemesrud was not a
licensee for sale of intoxicating liquor or beer.23 Neis consumed the
liquor, became intoxicated, and was involved in a collision with Vern
and Marjorie Williams. 24 On the night of the accident, the relevant
statute25 provided:
Every ... person who shall be injured in person or property by any
intoxicated person . . . shall have a right of action . . . against any
person who shall, by selling or giving to another contrary to the pro-
visions of this title any intoxicating liquors, cause the intoxication of
such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as exemplary
damages.26
Neis fell into the category, "any person." 27 The Iowa legislature,
subsequent to the accident, enacted a new Liquor and Beer Control
Act that specifically repealed chapter 129 of the Iowa Code and went
into effect on January 1, 1972.28 Therefore, the Court applied the
21. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W. 2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
22. Id. at 615
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. IOWA CODE §129.2 (1966).
26. Williams, 197 N.w.2d at 615.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 616 (the legislature in 1971 in the Liquor and Beer Control Act expressly repealed
both sections 129.2 and 123.95).
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state dram shop act in Williams but noted that, due to the 1972 legisla-
tion, its holding would be inapplicable to future cases.29
The next major case on the subject to come out of Iowa was Clark v.
Mincks.301 William and Larry Mincks ("the Mincks") hosted a party
on October 1, 1982 that continued into the early hours of October 2.31
One of the guests, to whom they gave beer or other intoxicants when
she was intoxicated, was Nancy Mincks. 32 Nancy drank "over ten
twelve-ounce cups of beer" at the party.33 At around midnight Nancy
and another guest decided to take some of the children into town to a
tavern that had video games. 34 Nancy drove one of the vans to the
tavern and was involved in an accident on the way.39 Nancy and a
child, Michelle Clark, were killed. 36 Nancy's blood-alcohol level, at
the time of the wreck, was .222.37
The parents of Michelle Clark sued the Mincks under a common
law claim of negligence arising from violation of a statute.38 Section
123.49(1)39 stated: "No person shall sell, dispense, or give to any intox-
icated person, or one simulating intoxication, any alcoholic liquor or
beer."4 () The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the 1972 Act did not
preempt common law liability. The court held the Mincks liable for
the actions of an intoxicated adult guest's decision to drive drunk. 41
The Iowa legislature responded to the Court's decision by amend-
ing §123.4942, which made it a criminal offense to provide alcoholic
beverages to intoxicated persons. The legislature declared that a non-
licensee is not civilly liable to third parties injured by the consumer of
the beverages even if they violate the statute. The statute now states:
1. A person shall not sell, dispense, or give to an intoxicated person,
or one simulating intoxication, any alcoholic liquor, wine, or beer.
29. Id. at 616 ("In discussing this legislative action obviously aimed at restricting dram shop
liability to licensees and permittees only, we said in Williams, 197 N.W.2d at 616, 'it is apparent
that cases such as this [i.e., attempting to impose dram shop liability on one who is neither a
licensee or permitee] will not arise in the future." Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226, 233 (Iowa
1985) (McGivern J., dissenting in part and concurring in part)).
30. Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985).
31. Id. at 227.
32. Id.
33. Id at 228.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Clark, 364 N.W.2d at 228.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. IOWA CODE §123.49(1) (1983).
40. Id. (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 231.
42. IOWA CODE §123.49 (1987).
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a. A person other than a person required to hold a license or permit
... is not civilly liable to an injured person or the estate of a person
for injuries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the
consumer of the alcoholic beverage, wine, or beer.
b. [T]he holding of Clark v. Mincks, 362 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985) is
abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer rather than the serv-
ing of alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer as the proximate cause of
injury inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.43
B. Minnesota
Minnesota adopted its Dram Shop Act or Civil Damage Act in
1911.44 At the time of its adoption Minnesota's Dram Shop Act 4 5
provided:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other
person who is injured in person or property, or means of support, by
any intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of any person, has a
right of action, in his own name, against any person who, by illegally
selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxica-
tion of such person, for all damages sustained; . . . .46
Two classic examples of a host dispensing liquor illegally are "pri-
vate individuals who invite guests of all ages to wedding receptions
and employers who act as hosts at company picnics." 47
The 1911 Dram Shop Act was applied in Ross v. Ross.48 Delmar
Ross and Joel Johnson purchased liquor for Delmar's brother, Rod-
ney Ross, who was only 19 years old.49 Rodney became intoxicated
and drove his car off the road resulting in his death.50 An action was
brought under Minnesota Statute 340.95, popularly known as the
Dramshop Act or Civil Damages act on behalf of Rodney's infant son
and by Rodney's parents.5'
The Minnesota Supreme Court started its analysis by stating that
the Act had never been applied to permit recovery against an individ-
ual not in the business of dispensing liquor. 5 2 The Court, therefore,
reviewed the legislative intent of the Act and concluded that the legis-
43. IOWA CODE ANN. §123.49 (West 2006).
44. Ross v. Ross, 200 N.W.2d 149, 151 (Minn. 1972).
45. MINN. STAT. §340.95 (1911).
46. MINN. STAT. §340.95 (1911) (emphasis added).
47. Ross, 200 N.W.2d at 151.
48. Id. at 149.
49. Id. at 150.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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lature intended to "create a new cause of action against every violator
whether in the liquor business or not."5 3 It looked to the plain lan-
guage of the statute which, as drafted, created a cause of action
against "any person" who illegally sold or gave intoxicating liquors to
another person causing intoxication which resulted in damage to a
third party.54 The Court found it significant that as far back as 1882 it
had construed the words "any person" so as not to restrict prosecu-
tions for liquor violations to those in the business.55 Finally, the Court
noted that because the act only applied to illegal transactions, "it is
not unreasonable to assume that the legislature intended to include
persons other than the licensed vendors."5 6
The Court then stated that "[iut may well be that the legislature in
light of our present holding will amend the Civil Damages Act to per-
mit one who is not in the liquor business to assert the defense of due
care."57 The legislature, in fact, went even further. In 1977, five years
after the holding in Ross, it abrogated that decision by amending Min-
nesota's dram shop act so that it no longer applied to social hosts.5 8
The legislature removed the words "or giving" from the list of prohib-
ited activities involving alcohol.59
Holmquist v. Miller60 was a consolidation of three cases involving
actions brought against social hosts for damages resulting from auto-
mobile accidents caused by minors' intoxication. 6 1 The Minnesota Su-
preme Court reviewed the history of Minnesota's Civil Damages Act
and held that "a social host is not liable in a common-law action for
negligently serving alcohol to a minor . . . . In Minnesota, the field is
preempted by the Civil Damages Act." 62 Thus, since 1985 only com-
mercial vendors of alcohol can be prosecuted for liquor violations
under the Minnesota Civil Damages Act.
The current statute provides:
A spouse, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person injured
in person, property, or means of support, or who incurs other pecu-
niary loss by an intoxicated person or by the intoxication of another
person, has a right of action in the person's own name for all dam-
53. Ross, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53.
54. Id. at 151.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 153.
57. Id. at 152.
58. Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W.2d 468, 470 (Minn. 1985).
59. Id. at 470.
60. Holmquist v. Miller, 367 N.W. 2d 468 (Minn. 1985).
61. Id. at 469-70.
62. Id. at 472.
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ages sustained against a person who caused the intoxication of that
person by illegally selling alcoholic beverages. . . .63
C. California
"Before 1971, California case law had uniformly held that one who
furnished alcoholic beverages to another person was not liable for
damages resulting from the latter's intoxication." 6 4 In that year, the
Supreme Court of California decided Vesely v. Sager.65 Miles Vesely,
an injured motorist, brought an action against William Sager, individ-
ually and doing business as the Buckhorn Lodge, and others.66 Sager
owned and operated the Buckhorn Lodge, described as a roadhouse,
and was in the business of selling alcoholic beverages.67 On April 8,
1968, beginning at about 10 p.m. and ending at 5:15 a.m., past the nor-
mal closing time of 2 a.m., Sager served or permitted James
O'Connell, the driver of the vehicle which collided with Vesely's auto-
mobile, to be served "large quantities of alcoholic beverages."6 8 After
leaving the bar, O'Connell drove down a steep, winding, and narrow
mountain road, veered into the opposite lane, and collided with
Vesely's vehicle.69
The Court was persuaded by the reasoning of the cases that had
abandoned the common law rule and held that civil liability may be
imposed upon a vendor of alcoholic beverages for providing alcoholic
drinks to a customer who, as a result of intoxication, injures a third
person.70 The Court concluded, "it is clear that the furnishing of an
alcoholic beverage to an intoxicated person may be a proximate cause
of injuries inflicted by that individual upon a third person."7'
The Court also declared that a duty of care was imposed upon Sager
by Business and Professions Code section 2560272, which provided:
"Every person who sells, furnishes, [or] gives . . . any alcoholic bever-
age . . . to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misde-
meanor."7 3 The court explained that the Alcoholic Beverage Control
Act of 1935, of which section 25602 was a part, was adopted for the
63. MINN. STAT. ANN. §340A.801(1) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
64. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 149 (1978).
65. Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Cal. 1971).
66. Id. at 154.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 158, 160-61.
71. Vesely, 486 P.2d at 159.
72. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §25602 (West 1935).
73. Vesely, 486 P.2d at 159.
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"purpose of protecting members of the general public from injuries to
person and damage to property resulting from the excessive use of
intoxicating liquor" 74 and, therefore, a presumption of negligence
arises whenever its provisions are violated.
Although the Court in Vesely expressly reserved the issue of
whether a "noncommercial furnisher of alcoholic beverages may be
subject to civil liability under section 25602,"7 that issue was
presented in Coulter v. Superior Court.76 In 1978, the Supreme Court
of California became the first to impose liability on a social host for
harm caused by an intoxicated adult guest. James Coulter was injured
when the car in which he was a passenger collided with a roadway
abutment.77 Williams, who had become intoxicated at a party in her
apartment complex, drove the car.7 8 Coulter and his wife sued the
owner and operator of the apartment complex as well as the apart-
ment manager, alleging that they had negligently and carelessly served
"extremely large quantities" of alcoholic beverages to Williams, they
knew she was becoming intoxicated, they knew or should have known
she often drank to excess, and they knew she planned to drive, expos-
ing third parties to foreseeable harm.79
The Court held that "a social host who furnishes alcoholic bever-
ages to an obviously intoxicated person, under circumstances which
create a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to others, may be held
legally accountable to those third persons who are injured when that
harm occurs."8 o The Court reasoned that host liability stemmed both
from violation of statute,"' making it a misdemeanor to serve alcohol
to an obviously intoxicated person, 82 and from the creation of a rea-
sonably foreseeable risk of injury to others.83 The Court reviewed the
plain language of the statute and found that section 25602 is not lim-
ited by its terms to persons who furnish liquor to others for profit. 84
The Court found that although its placement in the Business and Pro-
fession Code might suggest the statute applied only to commercial
vendors, the term "every person" referred on its face to both commer-
cial and noncommercial suppliers of alcoholic beverages and, there-
74. Id.
75. Id. at 153.
76. Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144 (Cal. 1978).
77. Id. at 147.
78. Id. at 148.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 147.
81. CAL. BUS. & PROF CODE §25602 (West 1935).
82. Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 149.
83. Id. at 153.
84. Id. at 149.
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fore, section 25602 applied to commercial vendors and social hosts
alike. 5
Shortly after the decision in Coulter, the California Legislature
amended §25602 of the California Business and Professions Code,
reinstating the common law rule that the consumption, not the serv-
ing, of alcoholic beverages was the proximate cause of harm caused by
an intoxicated person. The current provision provides:
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, [or] gives . . . any alcoholic
beverage . . . to any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, [or] gives . .. any alcoholic bev-
erage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be civilly liable
to any injured person or the estate of such person for injuries in-
flicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of
such alcoholic beverage.
(c) [T]he holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153),
Bernhard v. Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313) and Coulter v. Superior
Court (21 Cal. 3d 144) [are] abrogated in favor of prior judicial in-
terpretation finding the consumption of alcoholic beverages rather
than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proximate cause of
injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.86
D. New Jersey
The New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in Kelly v. Gwinnell87
was the first in which a state Supreme Court imposed social host lia-
bility for injuries caused by an intoxicated adult guest that the state
legislature did not subsequently overrule. Donald Gwinnell and Jo-
seph Zak, spent an hour or two drinking after Gwinnell had driven
Zak home.88 During that time there was a dispute over whether
Gwinnell consumed no more than three drinks of scotch on the rocks
or as many as thirteen.89 On his way home, Gwinnell was involved in
a head-on collision with an automobile operated by plaintiff, Marie
Kelly, who was seriously injured. 90 Gwinnell's blood alcohol concen-
tration was 0.286 percent shortly after the accident. 91 Kelly sued
Gwinnell, who then brought a third party action against his hosts, the
85. Id. at 150.
86. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §25602 (West 2007).
87. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219 (N.J. 1984).
88. Id. at 1220.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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Zaks. 92 Kelly subsequently filed an amended complaint directly suing
the Zaks.93
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the de-
fendant hosts, the Supreme Court expanded liability from persons en-
gaged in the liquor business to include social hosts. 9 4 The New Jersey
Supreme Court held "only that where the social host directly serves
the guest and continues to do so even after the guest is visibly intoxi-
cated, knowing that the guest will soon be driving home, the social
host may be liable for the consequences of the resulting drunken driv-
ing."99 Therefore, the court made a narrow holding that was limited
to the situation in which a host directly serves a guest9 6 and did not
include situations such as "a party where many guests congregate," a
party where guests serve each other, a party where the host is occu-
pied "with other responsibilities and therefore unable to attend to the
matter of serving liquor, or a "drunken host."97
The Court began its decision by noting that New Jersey did not have
a dram shop act imposing liability on the provider of alcoholic bever-
ages and that, up to that point, decisional law had imposed liability on
such licensees and to a social host only where the guest was a minor.98
The court then reasoned that liability "proceeds from a duty of care
that accompanies control of the liquor supply," not from the deriva-
tion of profit from serving liquor, and, therefore, provided that "the
provider [of alcohol] has a duty to the public not to create foreseeable,
unreasonable risks by this activity."99
In the 1984 session of the New Jersey Legislature, bills were intro-
duced "to overturn Kelly, to immunize nonlicensees for civil liability
for serving alcohol, and to limit the extent to which licensees may be
held liable"; the bills failed to survive."on In 1987, New Jersey enacted
the New Jersey Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability
Act, 01 commonly known as the dram shop law. Section 2A:22A-4
now provides: "This act shall be the exclusive remedy for personal
injury or property damage resulting from the negligent service of alco-
92. Id.
93. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1220.
94. Id. at 1223.
95. Id. at 1228 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1221.
99. Kelly, 476 A.2d at 1224.
100. Sharon E. Conaway, The Continuing Search for Solutions to the Drinking Driver Tragedy
and the Problem of Social Host Liability, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 403, 413 n.67 (1988).
101. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:22A-1 to -7 (West 1987).
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holic beverages by a licensed alcoholic beverage server. . . ."102 Sec-
tion 2A:22A-5 now provides:
a. A person who sustains personal injury or property damage as a
result of the negligent service of alcoholic beverages by a licensed
alcoholic beverage server may recover damages from a licensed al-
coholic beverage server only if:
(1) The server is deemed negligent pursuant to subsection b. of this
section; and
(2) The injury or damage was proximately caused by the negligent
service of alcoholic beverages; and
(3) The injury or damage was a foreseeable consequence of the neg-
ligent service of alcoholic beverages.
b. A licensed alcoholic beverage server shall be deemed to have
been negligent only when the server served a visibly intoxicated
person, or served a minor, under circumstances where the server
knew, or reasonably should have known, that the person served was
a minor. 103
V. THE LIABILITY OF TAILGATERS, CONCESSIONAIRES,
TEAMS, AND LEAGUES
A professional team or sports league is rarely brought to trial,
largely because the team or league settles claims out of court for fear
of a large damages award. Two cases that named a professional foot-
ball team and the National Football League ("NFL") as defendants
were Brandjord v. Hopper'0 4 and Verni v. Stevens,105 out of Penn-
sylvania and New Jersey, respectively. Not surprisingly, in both cases
the team and the NFL settled.
A. Pennsylvania
In Brandjord, Michael Brandjord suffered serious personal injuries
while he attempted to cross 11th Street on foot and was struck by a
van operated by James Punch. 0 6 Punch, together with Thomas Hop-
per, William Campbell, and Charles Costello, attended a Philadelphia
Eagles game at Veterans Stadium against the Dallas Cowboys. 07
They arrived at the stadium at approximately 11:30 a.m. and tailgated
during the ninety minutes prior to the game, at which time they con-
sumed several twelve-ounce beers.108 During the game, the group sat
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:22A-4 (West 2007).
103. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:22A-5 (West 2007).
104. Brandjord v. Hopper, 688 A.2d 721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
105. Verni v. Stevens, 903 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
106. Brandjord, 688 A.2d at 722.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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in the same general area but Punch was not within the sight of any of
the others.109 The game ended at approximately 4:00 p.m. but due to
the large crowds and traffic delays the group decided to engage in
post-game tailgating.110 At around 6:00 p.m., after traffic had sub-
sided, Punch began to drive home."' At this time there was no indi-
cation that Punch was intoxicated. 112 At the same time Punch pulled
his van onto 11th Street, Brandjord was crossing 11th street on foot,
and was struck by the van."13
Brandjord and his wife filed suit against the three passengers in the
van as well as the City of Philadelphia, the Philadelphia Eagles, the
Philadelphia Parking Authority, Ogden Food Service Corp., and
Punch.114 The Philadelphia Eagles had either settled or been dis-
missed, along with some other defendants, and, therefore, this appeal
involved only two passengers, Campbell and Costello." 5 Brandjord's
claim was that the passengers' purchase and consumption of alcoholic
beverages jointly with Punch before the game were sufficient to estab-
lish liability under section 876 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts.116 Section 876, in relevant part, provides: "For harm resulting
to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is subject
to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to
the other so to conduct himself . . ."1n The Comment to §876(b)
states, in part: "If the encouragement or assistance is a substantial fac-
tor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor
and is responsible for the consequences of the other's act. ...
The court held that "[a] passenger does not owe a duty to a third-
person where the driver of the vehicle is intoxicated, particularly when
passengers and the driver merely participate in the joint procurement
and ingestion of alcohol . . . ."119 The court found that there was no
substantial assistance on the part of Costello and Campbell because
there was no evidence that they "pressured, coerced, or induced
Punch to drink at any time during the course of the day" and they had
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Brandjord, 688 A.2d at 722.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 723.
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §876 (2000).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §876 cmt. b (2000).
119. Brandjord, 688 A.2d at 723.
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not "furnish[ed] ... alcohol for Punch's consumption while Punch was
driving."1 2 0
The court looked to the controlling case of Welc v. Porter1 21 which
concluded that "where a passenger and driver purchased a large quan-
tity of beer, consumed it together, and were subsequently involved in
an automobile accident" substantial assistance was not found.12 2 The
court also noted that Punch, Campbell, and Costello were all adults
and Pennsylvania had never held an adult liable for serving alcohol to
another adult, thereby rejecting social host liability.12 3 The court reit-
erated that, with regard to social hosts, the common law view in Penn-
sylvania is that "'in the case of an ordinary able bodied man it is the
consumption of alcohol, rather than the furnishing of the alcohol,
which is the proximate cause of any subsequent occurrence,'"124 and
"'there can be no liability on the part of a social host who serves alco-
holic beverages to his or her adult guests.' "125
Therefore, in Pennsylvania, even if tailgaters are seen as social
hosts, which is unclear because the court never explicitly ruled on this
issue and because it would be difficult to determine which individual
or group was hosting, they are not liable for injuries caused by one of
their "guests" to a third party.
Pennsylvania also follows the common law, under most conditions,
with regard to licensed vendors. This can be seen in the current Penn-
sylvania Dram Shop Act that provides:
It shall be unlawful-
(1) Furnishing liquor or malt or brewed beverages to certain per-
sons. For any licensee . . . or any other person, to sell, furnish
or give any liquor or malt or brewed beverages . . . to any
person visibly intoxicated, or to any minor: Provided further,
That notwithstanding any other provision of law, no cause of
action will exist against a licensee . . . for selling, furnishing or
giving any liquor or malt or brewed beverages . . . to any in-
sane person, any habitual drunkard or person of known intem-
perate habits unless the person sold, furnished or given alcohol
is visibly intoxicated or is a minor.1 2 6
120. Id. at 725.
121. Welc v. Porter, 675 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996).
122. Brandjord, 688 A.2d at 725.
123. Id. at 726; see Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507, 510 (Pa. 1983) (explicitly rejecting social
host liability).
124. Id. at 726; see Klein, 470 A.2d at 510.
125. Hinebaugh v. Pa. Snowseekers Snowmobile Club, 63 Pa. D. & C. 4th 140, 151 (2003); see
Klein, 470 A.2d at 511.
126. 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4-493(1) (West 2006) (emphasis added).
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The statute provides, in essence, that the common law rule applies
unless the licensed vendor sells alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person
or a minor. "The statutory prohibition of said section 4-493(1) is not
limited to a 'licensee' as the words 'any other person' include non-
licensees of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board."1 27
B. New Jersey
The most recent and interesting case, due to the large damages
award at the trial level and its subsequent reversal, is Verni v. Ste-
vens.128 In Verni, the plaintiffs Antonia Verni and Fazila Verni were
severly injured when a car driven by defendant Daniel Lanzaro col-
lided with their car. 129 Antonia was two years old at the time of the
accident; Fazila was her mother.130 Lanzaro was intoxicated at the
time of the collision. 131
On October 24, 1999, at approximately 11:00 a.m., Lanzaro and
Michael Holder arrived at Giants Stadium to attend a football
game. 132 The two men tailgated before the game and entered the sta-
dium at approximately 12:30 p.m. for the 1:00 p.m. start.'33 Lanzaro
and Holder did not sit together because Lanzaro had purchased his
ticket from a scalper.134 The next time that Holder saw Lanzaro was
just before halftime, at approximately 2:30 p.m.'35 The two men left
the stadium sometime around the beginning of the third quarter. 3 6
They continued drinking after the game at two bars, Shakers and The
Gallery. 137
"Returning home from a family outing to pick up pumpkins for
Halloween, Ronald Verni, accompanied by his wife Fazila and their
two-year-old daughter Antonia, passed through Hasbrouck Heights,
about five minutes from Giants Stadium." 38 At approximately 5:47
p.m., shortly after leaving a restaurant, Lanzaro "swerved across the
127. Hinebaugh, 63 Pa. D. & C. 4th at 146; see Commonwealth v. Randall, 133 A.2d 276 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1957).
128. Verni v. Stevens, 903 A.2d 475 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
129. Verni, 903 A.2d at 483-84.
130. Id. at 484.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Verni, 903 A.2d at 485.
136. Id. at 486.
137. Id.
138. Richard M. Southall & Linda A. Sharp, The National Football League and Its 'Culture of
Intoxication:' A Negligent Marketing Analysis of Verni v. Lanzaro, 16 J. LEGAL ASPECTS
SPORT 121, 122 (2006).
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lane of traffic" and struck the car driven by Ronald Verni. 13 9 Officer
Corey Lange arrived on the scene and noted that Lanzaro appeared to
be intoxicated. 14 () A test taken at 6:25 p.m. revealed that Lanzaro had
a blood-alcohol concentration of .266 percent. 14 1 The results of the
accident were that Antonia was left a quadriplegic and her mother,
Fazila, "went into a coma, needed reconstructive surgery on her face
and had a rod inserted into her leg."1 4 2
Antonia, by her guardian ad litem, and Fazila filed a complaint
seeking compensatory and punitive damages against Lanzaro, Ronald
Verni, the New Jersey Sports & Exposition Authority, Giants Sta-
dium, the New York Giants, the NFL, Aramark and/or Aramark, Inc.;
Shakers and The Gallery; and Michael Holder.'4 3 The beverage
server defendants, at the time of trial, were identified as Harry M.
Stevens, Inc. of New Jersey (HMS), the owner of the stadium liquor
license and the concession contract, and Aramark Services Manage-
ment, Inc. (ASM), who employed the beer servers.14 4 The New York
Giants and the NFL settled out of court before the case went to trial
for $701,250.145 "Due to settlements and orders granting summary
judgment, the remaining defendants at the time of trial were HMS,
ASM and Shakers."1 4 6
At trial, Lanzaro admitted to drinking two or three twelve-ounce
beers at the tailgate 47 and two or more sixteen-ounce light beers dur-
ing the first half.148 When Lanzaro met Holder at halftime he was
carrying six sixteen-ounce beers and appeared intoxicated to his
brother and sister-in-law.149 Lanzaro maintained that he only drank
one or two of those beers but that shortly afterwards he smoked mari-
juana. 5 0 After leaving the game Lanzaro drank a beer before going
to Shakers and The Gallery, where he admitted to drinking only two
beers.' 5 ' At trial, "a jury found that Lanzaro had been served beer at
Giants Stadium when he was visibly intoxicated" and that "Lanzaro
and the Aramark defendants were equally responsible for the injuries
139. Verni, 903 A.2d at 486.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Southall, supra note 137, at 122.
143. Verni, 903 A.2d at 484.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 502.
146. Id. at 484.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 485.
149. Verni, 903 A.2d at 485.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 486.
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caused by the collision." 52 The jury awarded compensatory damages
in the amount of $53,950,000 and punitive damages in the amount of
$65,000,000, to Antonia, and they awarded compensatory damages in
the amount of $6,500,000 and punitive damages in the amount of
$10,000,000, to Fazila.153
The trial judge ruled that ASM was an agent of HMS and that the
Beverage Server Act governed its liability.154 Thus, the jury had al-
ready heard evidence about "the drinking environment [at the sta-
dium], the negligent supervision of employees and the inadequate
training of employees."155 The Beverage Server Act provides the ex-
clusive remedy for dram shop causes of action156 and narrowly defines
negligence as the service of alcohol to a visibly intoxicated person.'57
"Therefore, negligence is not definable by reference to regulations or
standards governing dispensers of alcoholic beverages or holders of
liquor licenses." 58 "The character of the place of dispensation is also
inadmissible because it is irrelevant to the central issue."' 59 There was
no evidence that visibly intoxicated people had been served alcohol by
the authorized beer sellers at the stadium. 160 Therefore, the Appel-
late Division held that the error caused prejudice because the jury
could not evaluate the evidence in a dispassionate manner, reversed
the trial court, and ordered a new trial.''
VI. WHAT CONSTITUTES VISIBLY INTOXICATED?
There are two important questions that must be considered when
discussing visible intoxication. First, what set of characteristics defines
someone who is visibly intoxicated? Second, how will proof that a
concessionaire sold alcohol to someone who was visibly intoxicated
come to life? These questions will be considered in turn.
The dram shop acts in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey state that
it shall be unlawful for a licensed alcoholic beverage server to serve a
visibly intoxicated person. But what characteristics define someone
who is visibly intoxicated? Is it only those characteristics visible to the
152. Idat 484.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 490.
155. Verni, 903 A.2d at 491.
156. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:22A-4 (West 2007).
157. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:22A-5 (West 2007).
158. Verni, 903 A.2d at 491; see Fisch v. Bellshot, 135 N.J. 374, 383 (1994).
159. Verni, 903 A.2d at 491 see Truchan v. Sayreville Bar and Rest., Inc., 323 N.J. Super. 40,
51-52 (App. Div. 1999).
160. Verni, 903 A.2d at 491.
161. Id. at 490, 494
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naked eye or are auditory and olfactory characteristics part of the def-
inition? As a start, the New Jersey Licensed Alcoholic Beverage
Server Fair Liability Act defines visibly intoxicated as a "state of in-
toxication accompanied by a perceptible act or series of acts which
present clear signs of intoxication."1 6 2 A perceptible act would imply
that it could be visible, auditory, or olfactory, however, because the
defined term is visibly intoxicated it is questionable whether it was
meant to include anything besides visible signs of intoxication. The
next step is to look to the case law.
In Verni v. Stevens, a number of witnesses testified that Lanzaro
appeared intoxicated, but every witness came to that conclusion based
on their own perception of Lanzaro's behavior. Lanzaro testified that
he was "drunk" by the end of the first quarter and "shit-faced" by just
before halftime.16 3 He also testified that he had been served while
visibly intoxicated at other games he had attended at Giants stadium
and had, in fact, never been refused service.16 4 Holder also testified
that he had been served while visibly intoxicated at Giants stadium.' 6 5
The testimony by Lanzaro is unhelpful, however, because he can not
view his outward appearance when ordering beers and, therefore, can
not testify to whether he was visibly intoxicated. At best, Lanzaro can
give a subjective account of how drunk he believed himself to be.
George Lanzaro, his brother, and Lisa Lanzaro, his sister-in-law,
met Lanzaro in the spiral by Gate D at halftime.16 6 George claimed
that Lanzaro appeared intoxicated because he had "'a blank stare
look,' was animated, loud, and had 'a very slight sway.'" 6 7 These
characteristics are visible and audible. Lisa also claimed that Lanzaro
appeared intoxicated because he "was slurring his words, using rapid
hand movements while talking, 'his eyes were drunk. . .like floating
eyeballs,' and he 'cupped' his cigarette." 68 Again, these characteris-
tics are visible and audible.
Another witness was Officer Corey Lange, who was at the scene of
the accident. Lange testified that Lanzaro appeared to be intoxicated
because he was "swaying, his eyes were bloodshot, his hand move-
ments were fumbling and slow, his face was flushed, and there was a
'strong odor' of alcohol on his breath." 6 9 These characteristics are
162. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:22A-3 (West 2007).
163. Verni, 903 A.2d at 485.
164. Id. at 486.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 485.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Verni, 903 A.2d at 486.
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visible and olfactory. The testimony by Officer Lange is unhelpful,
however, because he is viewing Lanzaro after the accident, long after
he left the game where concessionaires could serve him and shortly
after he left the bars where others served him or where he brought his
own alcohol.
The other witnesses that spoke to visible intoxication were two of
the plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Fred DelMarva testified that the
Training for Intervention Procedure for Servers ("TIPS") program
teaches alcohol servers how to spot behavioral cues of intoxicated per-
sons but did not specify what those behavioral cues were. 170 Dr. Rich-
ard Saferstein, however, testified that signs of visible intoxication
would include "poor body gait, inability to stand and walk properly,
poor muscular coordination, slow and unsteady hand movement, and
'perhaps but not necessarily slurred speech and. . .being boisterous
and loud."'171 These characteristics, although mostly visible, include
auditory signs as well.
There is no written decision from the Superior Court trial so it is
difficult to say with certainty what characteristics the jury used to de-
termine whether Lanzaro was served while visibly intoxicated. The
punitive damage award, at the trial level, was assessed "based on the
jury's belief that Aramark had sold beer at Giants' Stadium to a visi-
bly drunken Lanzaro."l 72 It is likely that juries will consider all the
testimony given by witnesses together, without separating the visible,
auditory, and olfactory signs perceived by witnesses and, therefore,
juries will consider auditory and olfactory signs to determine whether
a person was visibly intoxicated when served.
The more difficult question may be how to prove that a concession-
aire served alcohol to a person who was visibly intoxicated. The beer
server jobs were usually filled by senior, experienced union mem-
bers. 173 Even though experienced members fill these positions there
are a number of factors that make it difficult to show that a beer
server served a visibly intoxicated individual. First, as noted above,
Fred DelMarva discussed that alcohol servers who are TIPS-trained
can spot behavioral cues of intoxicated patrons. Only 59% of beer
servers and 21 % of cashiers, however, at the stadium were TIPS certi-
fied. 174 This means that there are many beer servers without the ben-
efit of training, on how to better spot behavioral cues that indicate
170. Id.
171. Id. at 487.
172. Southall & Sharp, supra note 138, at 123.
173. Verni. 903 A.2d at 489.
174. Id. at 486.
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intoxication, who must instead rely only on their past experience. An-
other factor is one brought up by Herbert Moskowitz, one of the de-
fendants' experts. Moskowitz criticized TIPS training explaining that
the program "'worked very effectively in a situation where you have
continual intermittent contacts with the individual drinking and you
can observe them over long periods and. . .observe how much they're
drinking.'""7 5 It is much more difficult for a beer server to spot visible
intoxication in the small window of time they interact with a customer
if they have not been interacting with that individual over the course
of the game, and because of the large number of individuals that a
beer server serves it is difficult for them to remember all their custom-
ers, even if they have interacted with them on more than one occa-
sion. Another factor is that the fans may purchase beer from more
than one vendor in more than one location.
In Verni v. Stevens, Lanzaro testified to purchasing beer from a
number of unidentified individuals operating either a concession
stand 7 6 or portable beer cart.'77 Also, all the beer servers working
near Spiral D had no recollection of serving Lanzaro and claimed that
they had not served or observed service to visibly intoxicated fans.17 8
Because no one can remember who served them or whom they served
it is almost impossible for plaintiffs to prove that a beer server served
a visibly intoxicated person. This is evidenced by the fact that
"[p]laintiffs produced no witnesses that actually observed Lanzaro
purchasing beer at the stadium on the date of the accident, nor did
they submit any internal reports that showed sales to visibly intoxi-
cated persons on that date."' 7 9
The appellate court noted that specificity was lacking in Verni be-
cause "the witnesses did not describe which beer servers had served
the patrons, how many patrons had been served, in which area of the
stadium the patrons had been served, and whether the patrons exhib-
ited signs of visible intoxication at the time of the purchase or ap-
peared sober during the brief transaction." 8 0 The appellate court also
noted that "evidence of drunken attendees is inadmissible because it
does not account for the possibility that patrons may have consumed
the alcohol off premises, before the game at a tailgate event, or that
the alcohol was purchased by a sober patron who supplied it to an
175. Id. at 488.
176. Id. at 485.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Verni, 903 A.2d at 485.
180. Id. at 493-94.
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intoxicated patron.""' The court did note, however, that evidence of
habit or routine practice is admissible to support an inference that on
a specific occasion a person acted in conformity with that habit, but
character evidence is inadmissible.18 2 If this is the standard used by
the courts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania, it makes it difficult to
prove that a concessionaire at a major professional sporting event
served a visibly intoxicated person and allows the owner of the sta-
dium liquor license either complete immunity of very strong
protection.
VII. WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE OUTCOME OF VERNI V.
STEVENS UNDER A SET OF PRESUMED CIRCUMSTANCES?
What would the outcome have been in Verni if we assume that there
were no procedural deficiencies, that all the parties were still part of
the suit at the time of trial, that Giants stadium was not owned by the
New York Giants, and that Lanzaro was legally intoxicated but not
visibly intoxicated? The parties of interest for this discussion are
Michael Holder ("tailgater"), the concessionaire, the New York Gi-
ants, and the NFL.
The New Jersey Licensed Alcoholic Beverage Server Fair Liability
Act provides the exclusive remedy for dram shop causes of action.183
Does this mean that common law claims are foreclosed by the Act?
In Truchan v. Sayreville Bar and Rest., Inc.18 4 the court held that all
common law claims that "arose out of, and were related to, the negli-
gent service of alcoholic beverages" are barred by the exclusivity pro-
visions of the Act. 8 Truchan, however, dealt with common law
claims brought against a licensed alcoholic beverage server. This
means that a common law claim of negligence may still be brought
against a social host. Three elements must be shown to establish a
cause of action in negligence: a duty of care owed by the defendant to
the plaintiff, a breach of that duty, and resulting harm to the plaintiff,
caused by the breach.
The next question would be whether the tailgater could be seen as a
social host. There is no decision in New Jersey on this issue but in
other jurisdictions it has been held that individuals who merely par-
ticipate in the procurement and ingestion of alcoholic beverages do
181. Id. at 492.
182. Id. at 493-94.
183. N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:22A-4 (West 2007).
184. Truchan v. Sayrevill Bar and Rest., Inc., 731 A.2d 1218 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999).
185. Id. at 1225.
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not owe a duty of care.' 86 In other words, individuals that buy a case
of beer together and drink it in the parking lot before going to the
game are not responsible for the actions of their fellow tailgaters.
Also, it is difficult to say that any one individual acts as the host of a
tailgate party and, therefore, should be liable for the actions of every
other individual that may have taken a beer from a case that individ-
ual bought. Therefore, it is unlikely that Holder would have been lia-
ble as a social host.
HMS, the owner of the liquor license, was a subsidiary of Aramark
Corporation.'17 HMS leased its employees from ASM, a union shop
and another Aramark Corporation subsidiary."8 The Beverage
Server Act provides the exclusive remedy against the concessionaire
because HMS is a licensed alcoholic beverage server. For the purpose
of this discussion, it is not important to discuss the issue of piercing
the corporate veil and whether the parent corporation could be liable
for the actions of both HMS and ASM. Under the assumed circum-
stances, the concessionaire would not be liable because Lanzaro was
not visibly intoxicated. Had he been visibly intoxicated, the conces-
sionaire would be liable and the corporate veil issue would be ripe.
With regard to the NFL and the Giants, the Vernis claimed that
they "had the authority to control the actions of others (including con-
cessionaires) in the . . . distribution of alcohol at Giants Stadium" not
that they "actually provided or served alcohol to Lanzaro." 18 9 The
trial court found that "the NFL had a duty to the Vernis to exercise
reasonable care in regulating the sale and the consumption of alco-
holic beverages at Giants Stadium."o9 0 That court reasoned that
"based on the NFL's involvement in league-wide alcohol policies and
stadium parking-lot security . . . the NFL had 'negligently failed to
exercise their authority to control the consumption of alcohol and the
use of illicit drugs at Giants Stadium and in the stadium parking
lots." 91 That court noted, however, that, in general "' . . . when a
person engages another to perform a contract, the person retaining
the contractor is not liable for the negligent actions of the contrac-
tor.' "192 It cited Mavrikidis v. Petullo, which outlines certain excep-
tions: "'(a) where the principal retains control of the manner and
means of the work; (b) where the principal engages an incompetent
186. Brandjord v. Hopper, 688 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
187. Verni v. Stevens, 903 A.2d 475, 490 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
188. Id.
189. Southall & Sharp, supra note 138 at 124.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 125.
192. Id. at 124.
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contractor; or (c) where the activity contracted for constitutes a nui-
sance per se.'" 1 93
The NFL is involved in league-wide alcohol policies, but league
rules are decided by a majority of the owners. It is the owners who
want alcohol to be served at games and, collectively, they are viewed
as the NFL, but it is not the NFL that contracts another to provide
alcohol service, it is the individual teams. Exceptions (a) and (b) give
some guidance on this issue. A team, such as the Giants, does not
control the manner and means of alcohol distribution. This is done by
the entity that owns the stadium. In Verni, The New Jersey Sports &
Exposition Authority consigned the sale of food and beverages within
the stadium to HMS, the liquor license holder.194 HMS and its parent
corporation controlled the hiring, training, and supervising of its em-
ployees and, therefore, controlled the manner and means of the work.
Evidence relating to the "wrongful hiring and supervision of [alcoholic
beverage servers]" is barred by the holding in Truchan.195 Therefore,
if anyone could be held liable it would be the owner of the stadium or
the concessionaire but not the team or league. However, the conces-
sionaire would not be liable unless it served a visibly intoxicated
person.
VIII. WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE OUTCOME OF VERNI V.
STEVENS, UNDER THE PRESUMED CIRCUMSTANCES, IN THE
OTHER STATES REVIEWED?
What would the outcome be, in circumstances similar to the as-
sumed facts above, in Iowa, Minnesota, California, and Pennsylvania,
for an individual tailgater, a team, and the league?
In Iowa and Minnesota, the state legislatures abrogated decisions of
their courts that held social hosts liable for injuries their guests caused
to third parties. Now the dram shop acts in both states provide that a
nonlicensee is not civilly liable to third parties injured by the con-
sumer of the beverages even if they violate the statute. Only commer-
cial vendors of alcohol can be prosecuted for liquor violations. The
Iowa dram shop act explicitly states that when it comes to social hosts
it will follow the old common law interpretation "finding the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer rather than the serving
of alcoholic beverages, wine, or beer as the proximate cause of injury
inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person." 96 Therefore, even
193. Id. at 125.
194. Verni v. Stevens, 903 A.2d 475, 490 n.2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
195. Id. at 491.
196. IOWA CODE ANN. §123.49(1)(b) (West 2006).
SOCIAL HOST AND DRAM SHOP LIABILITY
if a tailgater could be seen as a social host, in the states of Iowa and
Minnesota, the tailgater would not be liable for injuries caused to a
third party by an individual who drank with the tailgater.
Both dram shop acts provide that a licensed alcohol beverage server
may be held liable. If the team leased the stadium, the stadium did
not have a liquor license, and the stadium contracted out the conces-
sion contract, then a third party that was injured by an intoxicated fan
would have to bring an action against the concessionaire to recover
damages. If the team owned the stadium, the stadium had a liquor
license, and the employees worked for the Giants, then a third party
injured by an intoxicated fan could bring an action against the Giants
or a subsidiary of the Giants that controlled the staffing and operation
of the concession stands. If the employees were leased from a subsidi-
ary then the issue would become whether the corporate veil could be
pierced under the laws of the state to hold the particular team liable.
This would also be the issue regarding the league that the team was a
part of. The issues would be whether the league's participation in
league-wide alcohol policies means they failed to exercise their au-
thority to control the consumption of alcohol, whether they recklessly
disregarded the safety of third parties, and whether those reckless ac-
tions caused injuries to third parties.
In California and Pennsylvania the results would be much different.
The dram shop act in California explicitly states that, with regard to
both licensees and nonlicensees, the common law rule "finding the
consumption of alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alco-
holic beverages as the proximate cause of injuries inflicted upon an-
other by an intoxicated person"19 7 is to be followed. Therefore, in the
state of California an individual who may be viewed as a social host-
a tailgater-or a licensed alcoholic beverage server-a team or
league-is not liable for damages caused by an intoxicated individual
whom they served. The only liable party is the party who consumed
the alcohol.
The Pennsylvania dram shop act also applies to both licensees and
nonlicensees. Nonlicensees are included because the phrase "or any
other person" is included in the dram shop act.198 As discussed above,
the court in Klein v. Raysinger'99 explicitly rejected social host liabil-
ity. 200 Therefore, a tailgater, if he can be viewed as a social host, is not
liable for injuries to a third party caused by an intoxicated individual
197. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §25602(c) (West 2007).
198. 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4-493(1) (West 2006).
199. Klein v. Raysinger, 470 A.2d 507 (Pa. 1983).
200. Id. at 510-11.
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attending his tailgate. The Pennsylvania dram shop act also applies to
licensees. In Pennsylvania, a licensee will only be liable if he serves a
visibly intoxicated person or a minor.201 Therefore, if a team or
league is viewed as the licensed alcoholic beverage server in Penn-
sylvania, they can be held liable only if they served a visibly intoxicate
person or a minor and the visibly intoxicated person or minor subse-
quently causes injuries to a third party.
IX. CONCLUSION
In sum, the common law rule was that the consumption of alcoholic
beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages was the prox-
imate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated per-
son. It was not until the adoption of statutes specifically imposing civil
liability upon a furnisher of intoxicating liquor under specified circum-
stances that anyone besides the intoxicated person could be held
liable.
A number of states have imposed liability upon social hosts, but the
state legislatures have quickly reinstated either complete immunity or
granted the social host very strong protection. States have also im-
posed liability upon licensed alcoholic beverage servers, under their
dram shop acts, but, once again, the state legislatures have either rein-
stated complete immunity, such as in California, or granted the serv-
ers strong protection through ambiguous language, such as the visibly
intoxicated standard in both Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The visi-
bly intoxicated standard is especially hard to prove because fans at
sporting events only interact with servers for a short period of time
and can buy alcohol from multiple areas all over the stadium. Be-
cause there are so many beer servers it is difficult for witnesses to
identify which server served the intoxicated person and whether the
server could identify the individual as visibly intoxicated during their
short interaction, where conversation is minimal.
n all five states reviewed-Iowa, Minnesota, California, Penn-
sylvania, and New Jersey-a social host could not be held liable for
injuries inflicted by the consumer of alcoholic beverages. In Califor-
nia, a claim brought against a commercial vendor would fail because
California follows the common law rule for both social hosts and com-
mercial vendors. In Pennsylvania and New Jersey, a claim brought
against a commercial vendor has a limited chance of success because
the plaintiff must prove that the person who inflicted their injuries was
visibly intoxicated when served. Of the states reviewed, an individual
201. 47 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §4-493(1) (West 2006).
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would have the best chance of success if they brought suit in Iowa or
Minnesota, where there is not a visibly intoxicated standard.
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